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ABSTRACT 
 
Reverse Auction Bidding systems are increasingly used by some large corporations 
for the supply of buildings, an example is the major firm Target. The belief is that the 
Reverse Auction Bidding system improves the efficiency of the bidding system and leads 
to cost savings during the construction process. Neither statement has been shown to be 
correct at this time. A game theory was developed for the Reverse Auction Bidding system; 
this theory postulated that two sub-games exist within the overall Reverse Auction 
Bidding game. The first sub-game is between the purchaser and the set of bidders. The 
purchaser is presented with a group of lowest prices that under the rules of the game must 
be accepted. This group of prices has been shown to have a non-normal distribution in 
prior research at TAMU. If economic efficiency was to be maintained by the bidding 
system, one would expect a normal distribution with a tight range on the standard 
deviation, which does not occur. The second sub-game is between the bidders, who make 
use of the non-normal aspects of price group to maximize individual returns. All things 
being equal and given the intent of the game, the purchaser would expect the bidders return 
to be normally distributed with a small standard deviation representing a tight control on 
price, which has never been observed in game play. Three types of bidders have been 
postulated for the set, the first is an economically efficient bidder, an economically 
inefficient bidder, and a middle of the road bidder. 
This study aims to compare statistically the difference between economically 
efficient bidders, Type  bidder, and economically inefficient bidders, Type  bidder, in  
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terms of the statistical properties of the return data. The central hypothesis is that a 
statistically evident bias exists between the average return generated by the Type  bidder 
and the Type  bidder. The addition of the two distributions along with the average return 
generated by a Type  bidder results in the observed distribution for the group, . The 
secondary hypothesis is that Type  bidders minimize the price reduction for each bid. 
The first hypothesis is true, the Type  bidder earn on average twice the returns of the 
Type  bidder. The second hypothesis is not true, the Type  bidder as a set do not 
attempt to minimize the bid differentials. Further research is suggested on the statistical 
properties of the bid differentials as more games are played at TAMU. 

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
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
Definitions  
The following list contains terms associated with the reverse auction bidding game. 
These terms were defined by the previous RAB researchers at TAMU: 
RAB a type of auction in which the roles of buyers and sellers are reversed. In a 
regular auction (also known as a forward auction), buyers compete to 
obtain a good or service, and the price typically increases over time. In a 
reverse auction, sellers compete to obtain business and price decrease over 
time (Machado, 2009). 
RAB Game a standard game is eight rounds of twenty minutes 
Round a single twenty minute period played usually with four players, fifteen 
minutes is the bid period and five minutes for rest and to allow the 
computer system to model the actual work week 
Game Theory  a formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among intelligent and rational 
decision makers (van Vleet, 2004) 
Game             a  series of jobs for the construction of a reinforced concrete floor slab, each 
game lasts approximately 8 to 10 weeks in game play time, with each round 
of the game modelling a week and occurring in a 20 minute period, with 
15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of build time (Guhya, 2010). 
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Bid arrival      a record when bid activity occurs and creates a bid track on online bidding 
system. This record includes bidding information like price, bidder 
information, bid time, etc. 
KTS a self-assessed personality questionnaire designed to help people better 
understand themselves and others. It was first introduced in the book Please 
Understand Me. It is one of the most widely used personality assessments 
in the world, and its user base consists of major employers including Bank 
of America, Allstate, the U.S. Air Force, IBM, 7-Eleven, Safeco, AT&T, 
and Coca-Cola. 
SQL a special-purpose programming language designed for managing data held 
in a relational database management system. Originally based upon 
relational algebra and tuple relational calculus, SQL consists of a data 
definition language and a data manipulation language. The scope of SQL 
includes data insert, query, update and delete, schema creation and 
modification, and data access control. Although SQL is often described as, 
and to a great extent is, a declarative language (4GL), it also includes 
procedural elements. 
Defined Variables in the Game Theory 
The defined variables are: 
  player this represents the bidder group, treated as a single entity for the purpose 
of game analysis 

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 player the ith bidder in the bidding group 
 player this represents the purchaser  
 game The game played between bidders in seeking economic advantage over the 
remaining bidders. This game almost always disadvantages the  player, 
but the  player created the system and so is responsible for the  player’s 
economic losses as a result 
 game the postulated sub-game played within the Reverse Auction Bidding game 
between the purchaser and the bidders. In terms of this analysis it is deemed 
to effectively reduce to a two player game, with competition implications 
  bid time allowed for each round of play in the game 
 period between bid time  that represents the work time in the game 
i    Site number, [1 6]i   
j   Bid number counter, [1 ]j n  , a game is not valid without at least one 
valid bid 
n   total number of bids in the game 
  jth winning bid, where  
k   bidder number [1,2,3... ]m  
m  maximum number of bidders, typically 3, 4, 5 or 10 
   bidder k, bid set   
   bidder k , number of bids 
i



 
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   represents the maximum allowable price for each site i 
B  is the set of all winning bids, summed to the total cost for the game 
 This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the   player’s base price, 
although in this game K is a vector of costs.  
 This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the   player’s maximum 
incremental price above  
 This variable is normally defined by the set of numbers , 
although negative values of are permitted by the Reverse Auction 
Bidding system.  is used to normalize the profit data. A negative  
represents a loss on direct costs to the  player who makes this type of bid, 
and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt player. This type of play 
is discouraged as the assumption in the game is steady state economic 
conditions in the outside economy. Future studies may look at a failing 
market, but that is beyond this study.  
   Set of price reduction or lost profit for each bid 
   Element of each set   
 Type  A more economically effective bidder.  
Type  A less economically effective bidder  
Type  Bidder who is within the middle of the range 
max
iB
 
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L   set of all bids for the game, this is a finite closed set, it may be the  , but 
this is improbable unless all players declined to participate. But there may 
be zero bids for one site during a game, but generally 
{ , , : L }L L L L L L          Clearly B L  . 
L   set of bids for Type   bidders, this is a finite closed set, it may be the   , 
but this would only occur if all four players had identical returns, 
improbable but not impossible or where L   , generally :L L L   . 
It is true that 
1 1
p p
L L
 
   , it is true that 1 1
p p
L L
 
   , but it is 
false that 
1 1
p p
L L
 
   , it may be true but it is not necessary in order 
for these sets to define the three bidder types.  
L   set of bids for Type   bidders, generally :L L L    
L   set of bids for Type   bidders, generally :L L L    
   empty set 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Introduction and Study Purpose 
This thesis summarizes an investigation into a number of Reverse Auction Bidding 
studies completed at TAMU. This thesis presents the literature review for related to the 
current research, the study methodology, provides an outline of the results and the analysis 
and provides conclusions on the research. This chapter outlines the background to the 
study, summarizes the objectives of the study, develops the hypothesis and outlines the 
limitations of the study research.  
This thesis includes details of the game developed by van Vleet (2004) and as such 
some the game description material and figures in this report is common to this study and 
others. It is suggested that a manual should be developed for the game, although this is 
beyond the scope of this research work. 
Background 
A reverse auction is a type of auction in which the roles of buyer and seller are 
reversed. Specifically the bidders compete to obtain business from the purchaser and the 
fundamental hypothesis is that prices will decrease as the bidders undercut each other.  
Vleet (2004) initiated the ongoing study of Reverse Auction Bidding at Texas A&M 
University.  
Reverse auction bidding (RAB) is an innovative procurement method. Its name 
indicates its distinct feature, the reversed roles of buyers and sellers. It was used in 
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materials and services of commercial as well as construction procurement. And a number 
of private and government agencies in construction industry are utilizing RAB as their 
method of procurement. This study continues a long running study into the process and 
features of Reverse Auction Bidding at TAMU. Van Vleet (2004) initiated the ongoing 
study of Reverse Auction Bidding at Texas A&M University. The work now includes 
twenty studies that have developed the game theory associated (Maschler, Solan, & Zamir, 
2013) with this game and the statistical techniques used in the analysis of the results for 
each game (Guhya, 2010).  
RAB as a bidding system is distinct from the sealed hard bid, the traditional 
procurement method used in construction up until the early 1990s. In the traditional sealed 
hard bid, the lowest price is still the major criterion for awarding bid. However, all sellers 
only have one time to bid the project almost always anonymously and all bid prices are 
sealed in the bid package prior to the opening of the tenders. This is a simple game, with 
one bite of the cherry so to speak. Of course there are variations related to bidder capability, 
capacity and prior relationship to the purchaser, but provided one uses a pre-registration 
and review this remains the most economically effective method for purchasing 
construction related activities and goods (Reinisch, 2011). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the statistical properties of three subsets 
of the bidding set, . The bidding set is the set that contains all of the individual bids, 
essentially an integer set of numbers constrained by the game to the range of 10,000 to 
35,000. The three subsets, postulated from earlier work, (Yuan, 2013), are the set of bids 
for the better bidders, termed Type  bidder, and this bidding set, termed  and the 
L
 L
   3 
poorer bidder, termed the Type  bidder, and this bidding set, termed , and the average 
or Type  bidder, with a bidding set termed, . 
The set  is then defined as the complete set, . The use of set theory, 
(Borowski & Borwein, 1989), provides a mathematical formalism for describing the game.  
The central hypothesis for this research is based on the observation in early work 
that some bidders performed significantly better than other bidders. Variable names have 
been assigned to the three types of bidders identified in previous research, as defined in 
Nomenclature.  
Objective of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to compare statistically the difference between the good 
or type  bidders and the poor or type   bidders in terms of the statistical properties of 
the bid differential or  sets. In addition, this study also analyzes the statistic property of 
the profit loss of type  bidders and type  bidders, defined from the analysis of the  
sets. 
Hypotheses 
The central hypothesis in mathematical terms states that:  
A statistically evident bias exists between the average return generated by 
the Type  bidder and the Type  bidder.  
This hypothesis is based on the observation that the returns in the previously studied 
games are not normally distributed, but show a distribution with two distinct peaks for the 
normalized profit data (Saigaonkar, 2010) . Normalization in this sense is the 
 L
 L
L {L , , }L L  
 

  
 
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transformation of profits into a range from zero to one. Hence, the addition of the two 
distributions along with the average return generated by a Type  bidder results in the 
observed distribution for the group, .  
The second hypothesis is that:  
Type  bidders minimize the price reduction for each bid.  
This aspect of game play has not previously been investigated using the existing 
Reverse Auction Bidding data sets. The theoretical idea is that the better bidders limit their 
losses on each bid.  
Significance 
The ultimate goal is to produce a conceptual Turing Machine (Church, 1941) that 
matches and beats a human bidder without the human bidder being aware that they are 
playing a machine. There are very many aspects to this problem, not the least of which is 
determining the strategy for an economically efficient bidder. In game theory, one is 
interested in the outcomes, which can be difficult to quantify, but for this game the simple 
outcome for the bidding sub-game is the greatest return. This research will help the further 
understanding game play methods of the characteristics of economically efficient bidders 
in Reverse Auction Bidding.  
Mikael (2014) postulated that human players will compensate for the actions of a 
Turing Machine type player and will ultimately beat the machine, if it attempts to play at 
human speeds. The long term goal would be to develop a flash bidder, although there are 
ethical issues with this type of future development.  
 

L

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Limitations 
The data collected in this study will be the result of TAMU simulated bidding 
process. In the bidding process, all games will be limited to four players. The bidding 
process will be based on a concept phase, in which the bidders’ only emphasis is the price, 
however, economic and all the other conditions that may have side effects on the bidding 
process are assumed steady throughout the period of the bidding process. In addition, there 
are no professionals from industry participating in this process. All the participants are 
faculties or students from Construction Science Department of Texas A&M University, 
the sample size is relatively small and lacking diversity in the background and age. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Introduction 
This literature review provides a summary of the main elements of the research into 
Reverse Auction Bidding to this time. An increasing number of construction industry 
corporations are engaged into application of reverse auctions, which it is postulated can 
improve market efficiency, procurement process efficiency, and access to larger supplier 
base to achieve considerable savings in purchase cost. This brief review considers some 
of these aspects related to RAB.  
Texas A&M Studies 
Extent literature surveys exist in the prior work completed at TAMU in the period 
2004 to 2013 (Chaudary, 2009; Gregory, 2006; Guhya, 2010; Gujarathi, 2008; Gupta, 
2010; Machado, 2009; Panchal, 2007; Piper, 2013; Plumber, 2010; Saigaonkar, 2010; 
Shankar, 2005; van Vleet, 2004; Zhou, 2012). This work initially looked at the 
development of the web based system, followed by consideration of personality types and 
its impact on bidding and recently on the development of the game theory related to 
reverse auction bidding.  
Other Auction Types 
This section presents a summary of other auction types and issues associated 
with the system including: 
 Traditional Types of Auctions 
o English Auctions 
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o Dutch Auctions 
o Sealed First Price Auctions 
o Vickrey Auction 
o Other Types of Auctions 
o Reverse Auction Bidding 
 Reverse Auction Bidding in Construction Industry 
o Posited Savings for RAB 
o Procured Items 
o Legal Issues 
o Buyer to Seller Relationship 
o Reverse Auction Bidding Myths and Reality 
o Influence of Personality Types to Reverse Auction Bidding 
Outcome 
 Mathematical Theory of the Reverse Auction Bidding 
 Bid Arrival Timing and Other Game Issues 
 Summary 
Traditional Types of Auctions 
An auction is that one can procure goods and services through the use of a bidding 
mechanism. There are different kinds of traditional auctions and Klemperer (1999) 
classified four main types of auctions. These four auctions are English auctions, Dutch 
auctions, sealed first price auctions and the Vickrey auctions. There are also other types 
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of auctions, including the Japanese auctions, the Take-it-or-leave-it auctions, and the 
Candle auctions, to list some of the variants. 
English Auctions 
English auction, also known as forward auctions or ascending auction is the most 
commonly used form of auction. It is suitable for limited supplied goods or unique sold 
items (Sam Wamuziri, 2009). In English auctions, the bidding process was started with 
the lowest acceptable price for seller, usually the reserve price. Each bid after that point 
must exceed this price. As a result, a seller could keep the item from selling for less than 
this reserve price, where it has been set at the beginning of the auction. Bidders then begin 
bidding over the items against each other by placing higher price than the last bid. The 
auction terminates when no more bidders are willing to offer a higher price. Moreover, 
the item sells at the highest bid. A seller will hold the items, if the final bid price does not 
exceed the reverse price. The notable characteristic of English auction is that each bidder 
knows the level of the current best bid during the whole auction process (McAfee & 
McMillan, 1987).  
This type of auction is used to sell antiques or artworks. The point is to maximize 
returns by allowing the market to establish the price points (Hartford, 2005). As you would 
expect for these types of auctions for topline artwork the market has developed to a few 
centralized locations in England and New York.  
Dutch Auctions 
Dutch auction, also called multiple items auctions or open descending price auction 
(Krishna, 2009), is named for the Dutch tulip auctions. It is a converse type of auction 
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when compared to the English auction. The seller initially calls a very high price. Seller 
will constantly lower the price through each round of bid until a bidder is finally willing 
to accept this price. The Dutch auction relates the price paid to the time of the auction. 
Namely, the longer the auction goes on, the lower the price.  
In a Dutch auction, rational bidders always have their own clearly acceptable 
valuation of the item for sale. The auction begins with a price, which is inevitably over 
this valuation, while the bidder keeps waiting. Once the successively lowered sale price 
comes down and reaches this amount, a buyer may accept this offer but obtain a zero profit. 
Waiting longer to bid a lower price will increase the bidder’s profit. However, this 
behavior provides the economic risk that the bidder may end up losing the item to another 
bidder (Sam Wamuziri, 2009).  
So Dutch auctions force bidders to think about their own valuation of the item before 
the auction and act decisively while bidding. This type of auctions is often used for 
perishable items (McAfee & McMillan, 1987) like flowers in the Netherland, fish in Israel, 
tobacco in Canada, and used furniture. These items are used locally, in contrast to the art 
auctions, where the product may end up at any location in the world that a major art 
collector chooses to live.  
Sealed First Price Auctions 
Sealed first price auction is a first price sealed bid auction (FPSB). Different from 
English auction, all bidders just simultaneously submit only one bid (Krishna, 2009). Like 
the English auction, the item goes to the highest bidder. Sometimes, a seller will choose 
the winner randomly from those who name the same highest bid, if there is a tie. The 
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fundamental rule of sealed first price auction is that all bidders could not know the bid 
information of other competitors before the end of the auction and also couldn’t adjust 
their own bids according to other’s bids (McAfee & McMillan, 1987).  
In sealed first price auction, the bidder gets three options. They are:  
 to bid his/her full valuation 
 to bid a shaded value of the full valuation 
 to bid considerably under the valuation(Sam Wamuziri, 2009).  
Options 3 may lead the bidder to losing the bid to their competitors, while option 1 
could gain the bidder no profit if their bid was successful. As a result, rational bidding 
strategy for sealed first price auction should be bidding with a shaded value of the full 
valuation. With this approach, the bidder could make a profit and win the bid at the same 
time. The bidder gains more profit with higher shaded value held. Too much shaded value 
may increase the risk of losing the bid.  
So, this kind of auction forces bidders to guess the valuation of others’ and bid a 
little more than this amount (S. Wamuziri & Abu-Shaaban, 2005). Some UK construction 
procurement uses this type of auctions. UK construction is often based on the work by the 
Quantity Surveyor who provides an estimate of the construction costs to the purchaser 
(RICS, 2000); this system has a number of economic advantages for the purchaser in 
having: 
 a pre-bid estimate from an estimating expert 
 a consistent set of quantity take offs guaranteed by an independent expert 
 a standard for the quantity methods that is agreed across the industry 
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 a document that has been tested in the courts 
Vickrey Auction 
Sealed second price auction is similar to sealed first price auction, where all bid 
will be sealed and revealed at the same time. What makes them different is that the winner 
of this kind of auction only needs to pay the second highest price bid other than the highest 
one. It is also called Vickrey auction to commemorate the economist who first put forward 
that this type of action as it pushes each bidders to bid their true valuations (Sam Wamuziri, 
2009). Overall, the best strategy of sealed second price auction is to bid the true value, 
which is identical to English auction. However, they have different information 
transparency (Sam Wamuziri, 2009), since sealed second price auction needs  information 
transparency. 
In addition, each bidder is in a passive condition. As a result, sealed second price 
auction is seldom used in practice. A sealed second price auction is a very good tool to 
model bidder‘s behavior, since bidder needs to bid their true value. Vijay (Krishna, 2009) 
pointed out that sealed second price auction is in some ways similar to proxy bidding 
system, which is used by Internet auction site like eBay. In eBay, a bidder who bided the 
highest is awarded the bid by actually paying the current highest bid plus the current 
bidding increment (Krishna, 2009). 
Other Types of Auctions 
Besides those four types of auction mentioned above, there are still some other types, 
like Japanese auction, Take-it-or-leave-leave-it auction and Candle auction. In a Japanese 
auction, the price rises up through each round of bid. Each bidder shows if they are willing 
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to stay at the current price level for each round. Once a bidder quits, the bidder will not 
reenter the auction. In Take-it-or-leave-it auction, the seller announces the price of each 
project, and bidder can choose accept (“take”), which leads the end of auction, or reject 
(“leave”) the bid, after which seller goes to the next. The clear advantage of this type of 
auction is that protect the private valuation information (Sam Wamuziri, 2009). In Candle 
auction, the bid is awarded to the last bid price before a candle burns out (S. Wamuziri & 
Abu-Shaaban, 2005). This is similar to the RAB where a timer runs out.  
Reverse Auction Bidding 
Reverse Auction Bidding is a relatively new type of procurement method, which 
has the roles of the bidder and seller reversed, which has been studied for about 20 years.  
It is also regarded as an internet-based system. This new type of auction that was known 
in the mid-1990s as Business-to-Business (B2B) online Reverse Auction (Schoenherr & 
Mabert, 2007). The establishment of Web auctions as a tool to facilitate exchanges 
between buyers and suppliers is emerging as a new business paradigm. After this 
experiment a part of the Naval Supply Systems Command, in May 2000, tried Reverse 
Auction Bidding (Mabert & Skeels, 2002). 
At the same time, many  Fortune 1000 companied began tasting the benefits this 
new method of procurement (Emiliani & Stec, 2001). Web auctions of products like 
service or commodities are using sophisticated advertisement techniques to display the 
product being offered for sale. United Airline has started an online auction system for first 
class upgrade, this system has two similarities with Reverse Auction Bidding, the first one 
is that a group of bidders make offers for a special seat, the other one is the United Airline 
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will select the best offer to maximize their returns, which is also the market driven for 
Reverse Auction Bidding. The overall expectation from this published research is that the 
overall average price for bids obtained using the Reverse Auction Bidding Process would 
be lower than a hard bid system.  
This statement has not been shown to be correct at this time, nor is ever likely to 
be provable.  
Reverse Auction Bidding in Construction Industry 
In construction, the use of Reverse Auction Bidding is increasing. At a scheduled 
time, the owners open a bidding site with a “game” and bidders who are interested in the 
project submit their price to the web-based system. Then the web-based system posts the 
prices on the site for all bidders to compete. Contractors can lower the price to win the bid 
in a certain period of time. Compared to traditional sealed bidding, in which all bids from 
other bidders are kept confidentially, Reverse auction bidding provide opportunities for 
subsequent bidding after prices are open (Shankar, 2005) 
Some corporations use the Reverse Auction Bidding method to buy their 
construction materials. For instance, the Minnesota Department of Administration procure 
the construction products with the RAB method. In addition to the purchase of 
commodities, in a recent case, Pennsylvania’s Department of General Services also use 
the RAB technique procure construction services.  
Several private companies, such as Target have used Reverse Auction Bidding 
systems (Shankar, 2005; Yuan, 2013). 
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Posited Savings for RAB 
One study indicated that a properly executed reverse auction has the potential to 
save an additional 8 percent to 20 percent cost for an organization below its current price 
(Guillemaud, Farris, & Hooper, 2002). The Minnesota Department of Administration 
benefited from the use of RAB, which enable the Minnesota Department of 
Administration drop the price of the aluminum it purchased from $1.555 per pound 
$1.029 in 45 minutes. The state achieved a saving of $150,000 for taxpayers about over 
the course of five years. As summarized by the state, “A reverse auction gets to the 
absolute lowest price a vendor will offer, as opposed to a bid price [under the traditional 
sealed bid approach] that might not be the bottom line price” (Shankar, 2005) 
RAB has its own flaws or challenges to not only sellers but also buyers, 
everything has two sides. Strategic relationships and partnership between buyers and 
sellers might be impaired. “Because of excessively focusing on price, the online reverse 
auction has caused a move away from the close partnerships that were once successfully 
working for both buyers and sellers. An empirical study concluded that high emphasis 
on two main benefits of reverse auctions, purchase price reduction and time savings 
(procurement process efficiency), negatively impact the buyer-seller cooperation and 
sellers’ strategic relationships” (Pearcy & Larry, 2007). In order to win the bid, a seller 
has to lower its margin to a bare minimum. With such a low margin, there is no room for 
any adjusting and adapting to unforeseen situations. It can jeopardize long term buyer-
supplier relationships; reduce the suppliers’ trust and cooperation. Ultimately, it can 
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even lead to the erosion of the supply base and result in less competition and higher 
prices. 
Figure 1 clearly shows the problems with these claims. Results from earlier 
studies showed that the bidding set L  has a distinct non-normal distribution when the 
data is normalized. 
 
 
Figure 1. Normalized profit data for two earlier studies, after Saigaonkar (2010) 
A good game strategy can provide some players with returns higher than the 
average. Anecdotal evidence on Reverse Auction bidding shows that this happens in real 
systems. In terms of game theory, an auction can be considered a game between players. 
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One player,  ,  has a good for sale in a traditional auction and a good to purchase in a 
reverse auction.  
The other player,   ,  is typically a group that is bidding to purchase the item in 
a traditional auction or sell the item in a reverse auction. The  player derives from the 
concepts put forward by Church (1941). The  player sees a different statistical 
distribution set for each player in the   group, but the   merely observes one statistical 
distribution set. These statistical distribution differences form the basic element to this 
research work, as the point is to develop a machine bidder that outbids all human 
bidders, but is humanlike (Abelson, Sussman, & Sussman, 1987; Winston & Horn, 
1989). 
Procured Items 
The discussion, which questioned the feasibility of Reverse Auction Bidding of all 
kinds of products, has never stopped. Some researchers (Mabert & Skeels, 2002) studied 
some cases and concluded that Reverse Auction Bidding could not be suitable for every 
purchasing contract. Products, like strategic items and direct inputs, are not that accessible 
to Reverse Auction Bidding due to their long-term contract requirement or oligopoly 
among sellers, (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). The suitable ones included complex and 
highly-engineered items (Wagner & Schwab, 2004) or standard projects. Jap (2002) put 
forward that the only suitable products should be commoditized products.  
Schoenherr & Mabert (2007) explore this myths that Reverse Auction Bidding is 
commodities-products-only auction. They suggested having Reverse Auction Bidding for 
non-commodities products by refining the RFQ order, conducting market research and 
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analysis, defining detailed and specific attributes of projects, and using specialized third-
party consultant.  
Legal Issues 
As a new modern method of procurement, Reverse Auction Bidding attracted more 
and more attention from manufacturing and service sector business and government 
agencies. Its popularity also raised the concern of its legal and contractual issues. Research 
dealing with legal issue indicated that there was some unfair trade practice (Engel & 
Emiliani, 2007) during Reverse Auction Bidding. The unfairness came from the unequal 
positions of buyer and sellers.  
Sellers were facing sort of coercion in Reverse Auction Bidding. Horlen, Eldin, & 
Ajinkya (2005) analyzed the future legal challenges of Reverse Auction Bidding in terms 
of some legal grounds, like Federal Trade Commission, Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, 
Robinson-Patman Act, Clayton Antitrust Act and Business Method Patents. 
Reverse auction was banned by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 CFR 
245.610 and 48 CFR 15.610), because some flaws in legal performance (Merson, 2000), 
however, the prohibition was later removed. Though legal challenges existed in Reverse 
Auction Bidding awarded contract, Reverse Auction Bidding is still appealing to public 
buyer, like large international companies and government. The state of Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Kansas, New York State, Missouri, Minnesota, and Wisconsin (Horlen et 
al., 2005) had approved the legislation to allow Reverse Auction Bidding. 
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Economically the system is transparent and one could argue fair for all parties, 
provided that a coercive relationship does not exist or the game is not rigged, (Giampietro 
& Emiliani, 2007).  
Buyer to Seller Relationship  
Since price became the relatively decisive element in Reverse Auction Bidding 
process, the expected side effect is the negative impact Reverse Auction Bidding might 
bring to the buyer-supplier relationship. It is possible that buyer may omit the non-price 
elements like reputation, quality and previous partnership etc. This may result in 
deterioration of previous seller-buyer partnership. People question whether Reverse 
Auction Bidding can be used in procurement, which requires long-term seller-buyer 
relationship. Reversed auction was recognized to bring new business to new sellers who 
could offer lower price, while making current seller annoyed at losing the hard-won long-
term business (Emiliani & Stec, 2005). Due to its price oriented characteristic, Reverse 
Auction Bidding could lead to profit margin erosion (Emiliani & Stec, 2004) and coercion 
to sellers. In construction industry, seller-buyer partnership could be impaired when 
contractors, who won the contract with lowest price in Reverse Auction Bidding, would 
charge higher prices for change orders and extra work if client ordered, in order to keep 
their profit margin (Sam Wamuziri, 2009). 
While some researchers tried to refute by putting forward the idea that Reverse 
Auction Bidding could potentially benefit both sellers and buyers at the same time. Some 
researchers suggested that buyers, who need collaborative and long-term relationship 
sellers, can use Reverse Auction Bidding as a process improvement tools to check market 
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price instead using it as a price weapon (Smart & Harrison, 2003). Also, the buyer-seller 
relationship can be kept fair to all by prequalifying bidders with non-price elements, 
detailing RFQ, providing education, training and assistance to bidders during Reverse 
Auction Bidding process (Schoenherr & Mabert, 2007). 
An important economic observation is when all things are equal the prices should 
be the determining factor (Hartford, 2005) for projects funded by shared equity. Reinisch 
(2011) showed the problems with alternative bidding systems. 
Reverse Auction Bidding Myths and Reality 
Schoenherr and Mabert (2007) studied 30 case studies for companies that had 
participated in RAB systems, which enable  them investigate the most common myths 
related with Reverse Auction Bidding. They discussed myths for Reverse Auction Bidding:  
 Reverse Auctions are only about the price;  
 Reverse Auctions are only suitable for commodities;  
 Reverse Auctions damage the buyer-supplier relationship;  
 Savings in Reverse Auctions will decrease;  
 Reverse Auctions are passing fad. 
Figure 2 shows the current myths about reverse auction in the industry. Schoenherr 
and Mabert (2007) studied the reality vesus the myths based on their study of 30 
companies.  
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Figure 2. Common RAB myths after Schoenherr and Mabert (2007)  
The findings are: 
 While a lower price is one objective in reverse auctions, it is often not the 
most important one, and can be easily complemented with non-price 
attributes 
 While commodities are usually easier candidates for reverse auctions, non-
commodity items can also be put up for bid successfully 
 While reverse auctions can hurt buyer–supplier relationships, there are many 
ways to prevent that from happening 
 While first-time bidding events likely result in higher savings, continued cost 
advantages are possible 
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 While reverse auctions will not be used as much as in the past, they are here 
for the long-run 
Influence of Personality Types to Reverse Auction Bidding Outcome 
Students from Texas A&M University have conducted studies on RAB for the last 
decade. The research was commenced by van Vleet (2004), the theoretical basis of the 
study is the simulated bidding process which reflected the project of supply of slabs in 
Houston. In the following year, Shankar (2005) tested the methods from van Vleet’s study 
and showed that the results could be replicated. Rogers (2010) suggested that personality 
may have an impact on returns.  
Further studies have been conducted by Machado (2009) and Saigaonkar (2010) at 
TAMU to analyze the bidders’ personality impacts on the results. The work is based on 
the Keirsey Temperament Sorter test. Keirsey Temperament Sorter is a self-assessed 
personality questionnaire designed to help people better understand themselves and others. 
The test and scoring method are presented in Appendix A and B respectively.  
The Keirsey Temperament Sorter test has seventy-one questions, and identifies 
sixteen types of personalities that fit into four groups SJ - The Guardians, SP - The 
Artisans, NT – The Rationals, and NF - The Idealists.  
Table 1 shows the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test categories.  
 
 
 
   22 
Table 1 
Keirsey Temperament Sorter Matrix 
 Temperament Role Role Variant 
Introspective 
(N) 
Idealist (NF) 
Diplomatic 
Mentor (NFJ) 
Developing 
Teacher (ENFJ): Educating 
Counselor (INFJ): Guiding 
Advocate (NFP) 
Mediating 
Champion (ENFP): Motivating 
Healer (INFP): Conciliating 
Rational 
(NT) 
Strategic 
Coordinator (NTJ) 
Arranging 
Field marshal (ENTJ): 
Mobilizing Mastermind (INTJ): Entailing 
Engineer (NTP) 
Constructing 
Inventor (ENTP): Devising 
Architect (INTP): Designing 
Observant 
(S) 
Guardian 
(SJ) 
Logistical 
Administrator 
(STJ) 
Regulating 
Supervisor (ESTJ): Enforcing 
Inspector (ISTJ): Certifying 
Conservator (SFJ) 
Supporting 
Provider (ESFJ): Supplying 
Protector (ISFJ): Securing 
Artisan (SP) 
Tactical 
Operator (STP) 
Expediting 
Promoter (ESTP): Persuading 
Crafter (ISTP): Instrumenting 
Entertainer (SFP) 
Improvising 
Performer (ESFP): 
Demonstrating Composer (ISFP): Synthesizing 
 
Table 2 shows the categories in the KTS system. 
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Table 2 
Summary of the Individual Components of the Different Personality Types 
#  Name Meaning 
E Extraversion Feel motivated by interaction with people. Tend to enjoy a wide 
circle of acquaintances, and gain energy in social situations 
N Intuition More abstract than concrete. Focus attention on the big picture 
rather than the details, and on future possibilities  
F Feeling Value personal considerations above objective criteria. In 
making decisions, often give more weight to social implications 
than to logic 
J Judgment Plan activities and make decisions early. Derive a sense of 
control through predictability 
I Introversion Quiet and reserved. Generally prefer interacting with a few 
close friends rather than a wide circle of acquaintances, and 
expend energy in social situations 
P Perception Withhold judgment and delay important decisions, preferring to 
"keep their options open" should circumstances change 
T Thinking Value objective criteria above personal preference. When 
making decisions, generally give more weight to logic than to 
social considerations 
S Sensing More concrete than abstract. Focus attention on the details 
rather than the big picture, and on immediate realities rather 
than future 
 
This research has shown tentatively that the major personality type of Guardian 
always gives best performance in comparison to the other personality types. But in the 
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recent study conducted by (Piper, 2013), three guardians are beaten by an idealist. This 
requires further studies and demonstrates the complexity of the personality problems. A 
significant amount of work has been completed on personality impact at TAMU, clearly 
personality is one factor that affects performance. 
Mathematical Theory of the Reverse Auction Bidding 
The earliest research was interested in the ethical issues associated with Reverse 
Auction bidding systems. The main conclusion is that a purchaser is free to use a RAB 
system to purchase good, there are however several issues: 
 If only a single bid is submitted it is not likely to be at the lowest cost 
 Single bids occur frequently even in competitive games 
 humans make mistakes and miss things 
This mathematical theory has been used to review a number of case studies 
completed at TAMU, both with graduate students and now a set of four professional 
estimators (Piper, 2013). (Guhya, 2010) defined the bidders as Type  to represent a more 
economically effective bidder and as Type  to represent a less economically effective. 
Nichols (2010) defined Type   Bidder as bidders who is within the middle of the range 
for complete the set  . Type  have not yet been formally and statistically observed 
(Nichols, 2010).   
(Guhya, 2010) also discussed the Mathematical Theory of the Reverse Auction 
Bidding. Consider a Reverse Auction Bidding game where the  player is willing to 
accept bids of the type shown in equation (1): 



L 

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 ,       (1) 
 represents the upper limit the  player is prepared to pay in the game above the 
nominal minimum bid amount . A negative  represents a loss on direct costs to the 
player who makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt 
player. The concept of can be attributed to Professor Feigenbaum (Guhya, 2010), who 
considered there had to be an upper limit everyone was prepared to pay for a service or 
good.  
The bidding period for each game lasts for a set time, , in this case it is 15 minutes. 
The total cost for   player is shown in equation (2): 
,        (2) 
This total cost is based on the accepted lowest bid for each job, where a valid bid 
was submitted by the   player. Each  player then has a unique set of bids and a unique 
set of jobs, with a total return to the  player defined by a simple summation. 
The results of this statistical analysis using equation (1) and (2).  
Figure 3 shows the normalized profit levels for the four player game 
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Figure 3. Normalized profit levels for the four player game 
There are clearly two elements to the distribution, which has been consistent across 
game play from the earliest studies.  
Current Analysis 
The current stage in the analysis is to analyze the statistical properties of the profit 
drop on each bid, where the lost profit on a bid is defined as 
k
L  . It is postulated that the 
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statistical analysis of the sets of lost profit, 
k
L  , data will provide an indicator of the quality 
of the players. The data set of interest is shown in equation 3: 
,      (3) 
Bid Arrivals 
A research group has studied the arrival time of eBay bidding (Shmueli, Russo, & 
Jank, 2007). They stated that the arrival time of eBay bidding will fit the BARISTA model. 
The BARISTA (Bid ARrivals In STAges) is a three-stage nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process. The first stage is “espresso stage” (short and intense), in which the biding start. 
The second stage is called macchiato stage” (stained), which is during the mid-auction 
period with increasing intensity. The third stage is last moment of bidding, called “ristretto 
stage” (extra intense). In this stage, there are extremely intensive activities. This study 
gives instructions about the best time to bid. A Poisson process is a special type of Markov 
process that happens in a fixed consecutive time period (Boxma & Yechiali, 2007). As a 
continuous-time process, it is a mathematical model of a completely random series of 
events (Cox & Lewis, 1966). 
Yuan (2013) analyzed 6674 reverse auction bidding bid arrival times for nine 
previous TAMU reverse auction bidding case studies. Table 3 shows the individual 
Reverse Auction bidding games used by Yuan.  
A Poisson process counts the numbers of occurring events along the timeline and 
the time of the occurred events in a certain time interval. According to its characteristics, 
it is also a type of point process of the real half line. Yuan found that the results show that 
the Poisson process model for the arrival times fits the non-homogeneous Poisson process 
1
i i i
j j jB   
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(NHPP) model. The results from her study have the similar heterogeneity in RAB bidding 
dynamics to the situations of eBay online auction that were studied by others (Russo, 
Shyamalkumar, Shmueli, & Jank, 2004; Shmueli, Russo, & Jank, 2004; Shmueli et al., 
2007). 
Table 3  
Reverse Auction Games studied by Yuan 
Experiment 
Date 
Researcher 
ID 
No. of 
Contractors 
No. of 
Section 
No. of 
Projects 
No. of Bids 
5/4/2004 1 5 8 86 773 
5/29/2006 2 4 25 118 192 
6/4/2006 3 9 13 156 1077 
11/5/2007 4 4 5 43 346 
4/6/2010 5 5 8 54 804 
4/3/2010 6 37 10 179 776 
6/8/2010 7 4 10 97 865 
6/10/2010 8 4 9 92 759 
6/11/2010 9 4 9 91 1082 
TOTAL 9              76  97 916 6674 
 
Figure 4 shows a plot of the bid arrival times for the ninth case study, completed 
in November 2010. The data shows the bids pack into the higher end of the bidding time 
of 900 seconds, with most bids in the period 700 to 900 seconds.  
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Figure 4. Bid arrival time data for case study nine 
 Yuan divided the 900 seconds of game play into 180 intervals of five seconds each. 
She counted the arrival times for each 5 second interval for the complete data set. The 
results are plotted in Figure 5. The process has a theoretical upper limit of infinity, but one 
is constrained by the speed of human typing. Yuan in a simple study showed that a cutoff 
number of bids per second existed and determined this value. She showed that the upper 
limit of 140 matches the value reasonably.  
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Figure 5. Bid arrivals for complete set 
The author concluded from the analysis that reverse auction bidding bid arrival 
times follows a Poisson process, as for the eBay data (Shmueli et al., 2007). 
One of the main issues over the last decade, relates to the issue of timing. The game 
is played on the internet, the clock time on the various devices may be different and most 
likely are, causing issues on determining “finish time” for each game. This is not a trivial 
issue, and one that should be of concern to all involved in such games. 
Summary 
As an innovative procurement method, the application of RAB is increasing and 
developed. This literature review introduces existing procumbent methods and their 
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characteristics. Previous researched mainly studied on its external effects of RAB, such as 
potential savings, the applicable industry, related legal issues and effects for the relation 
between buyers and seller. Further studied discussed the advantages of Reverse Auction 
Bidding, which mainly discusses the cost savings; while, the some researchers also imply 
that Reverse Auction Bidding has its flaws, such as impairing the long-term seller-buyer 
relationship. 
The published article studying RAB dynamics (biding strategies and bidders’ 
performance) is rare, while some researchers studied the eBay auction performance. 
Because the eBay online auction and the Reverse Auction Bidding have significant 
similarities in bidding process, this literature review referred some studies on eBay online 
auction. Russo (2010) has studied the arrival time of eBay bidding. She stated that the 
arrival time of eBay bidding will fit the BARISTA model. The BARISTA (Bid ARrivals 
In STAges) is a three-stage nonhomogeneous Poisson process. The first stage is “espresso 
stage” (short and intense), in which the biding start. The second stage is called macchiato 
stage” (stained), which is during the mid-auction period with increasing intensity. The 
third stage is last moment of bidding, called “ristretto stage” (extra intense). In this stage, 
there are extremely intensive activities. This study give instructions about the best time to 
bid. Yuan (2013) analyzed the bidding data of Reverse Auction Bidding from previous 9 
experiments from TAMU, and the results have the similar heterogeneity in RAB bidding 
dynamics to the situations of eBay online auction that were studied by other Russo (2010). 
van Vleet (2004) started the ongoing study of Reverse Auction Bidding at Texas 
A&M University. This research continues today with twenty-four studies completed to 
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date. The theoretical basis of the RAB study is the simulated bidding process, using the 
supply of house slabs in Houston. The work is repetitive and simple, the participant is 
assumed to have a work capacity of three slabs per week, a rain element is introduced to 
provide a random element to the ability to complete work and the bank is willing to 
increase additional capacity for a fee, although for historical reasons the fee is termed a 
loan.  
Not all of the studies are suitable for use in this study, because of constraints 
introduced by the research question of interest to a particular study, such as owner’s 
interference. Nine studies had data suited to this study.  
Studies have been conducted  by Machado (2009), Guhya (2010) and Saigaonkar 
(2010) at TAMU to analyze the bidders’ personality impacts on the RAB returns. The 
studies are based on the Keirsey Temperament Sorter test. There have been studies in the 
areas of game theory, tacit collusion among bidders, the significance of personality, the 
RAB game for the role variants of guardians in different types of industrial and some 
specific cases studies. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology used for the Reverse Auction Bidding game 
site and the specific features applicable to this research study. The chapter contains a 
presentation on the game description, data structure and data analysis methods.  
Game Description 
van Vleet (2004) was interested in the ethical aspects of Reverse Auction bidding. 
He developed a simple game to study aspects of RAB (Kim, 2004). The simplicity 
introduced by van Vleet has allowed for significant exploration of personality, bid timing 
and now bid differentials. In the real world, prior to a RAB round, all sellers might have 
gone through a prequalification selection stage, so that final bid selection is based solely 
on submitted price. The assumption in this study is that only those who are prequalified 
can be involved in RAB bidding. During the auction process, prequalified sellers can bid 
multiple times anonymously. The TAMU web based system uses anonymous login names 
for each bidder to ensure a fair system, but participant selection is from students who have 
some construction industry experience. 
Guhya (2010)  in his review of the first case study outlined the RAB game as played 
at TAMU as an algorithm. The algorithm is shown in Figure 6. All the data is stored in 
the SQL dataset first and transferred in Microsoft EXCEL for analysis. Recently the site 
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has been redeveloped as an ASP.NET MVC 4 site to provide a modern interface to the 
Microsoft SQL Server database (Paz, 2013). 
 
Figure 6. Reverse Auction Bidding general algorithm after Guhya (2010) 
The idea is to develop some differences in the construction costs so that a single 
player could not follow a simple pattern to play the game. This system has been maintained 
in all games. 
van Vleet selected six sites in Houston for the game play. Figure 7 shows a map of 
the six sites used in all games since 2004. He assumed that all costs are based on the 
   35 
distance from Sugarland as the contractors would be near the purchaser. This is a 
reasonable assumption for this game study, providing some differentiation in costs for 
each site.  
 
Figure 7. Construction site locations in Houston  
The basic scenario developed by van Vleet. Significant advances have occurred 
with the web site; however, van Vleet established all of the critical factors for the game. 
The timing of each round of the game, representing a week, was set at 20 minutes, with 
15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of construction time. One subsequent game modelled 
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on a ten-minute week proved to be a disaster to play as a game and this idea was abandoned. 
Stable economic conditions are assumed to exist for the duration of the work. A game 
generally takes from three to four hours. Each game has eight to nine rounds of play, each 
round model a week in a real world scenario, but for efficient play is modelled as a twenty 
minute interval. The interval has fifteen minutes of play or bidding time and five minutes 
for recovery.  
Table 4 shows the location names for the six sites and the distance from the 
purchaser’s main office location in Sugarland. 
Table 4 
Location of the Construction Sites in Houston 
Site # Location of Development Distance from Sugarland (kilometres) 
1 Brookside Village 41.6 
2 Piney Point Village 24 
3 Highlands 70.4 
4 Jersey Village 40 
5 Bunker Hill Village 27.2 
6 Richmond 14.4 
 
Table 5 shows the site development costs for each of the locations. The base cost 
for the slab is $10,000.  
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Table 5 
Site Development Costs for Each Slab 
Site # Travel Cost ($) Delivery Cost ($) Total Cost($) 
1 858 624 1482 
2 495 360 855 
3 1452 1056 2508 
4 825 600 1425 
5 561 408 969 
6 297 216 513 
 
As Guhya (2010) noted the work is repetitive, as is usual for a production 
homebuilder, which simplifies the production process. In almost all of the research work 
to date, new players have been introduced for each game, as the research has focussed on 
the development of the player’s ability in the early stages of the game. 
The key assumption is that each Monday, the owner, termed the   player, posts the 
jobs that they are going to start that week. The data included is where each job is located. 
In the game play, the owners post the job offers and all the related information (like the 
location of the jobs, estimated cost of the jobs, etc) on the ASP based website (Kingsley-
Hughes, Kingsley-Hughes, & Read, 2004) every Monday, and then all the bidders log on 
to the web site and starting bidding for the jobs.  
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Table 6 lists the default variables for the Reverse Auction Bidding web site.  
Table 6 
van Vleet's Default Variables for Game 
Component Unit Amount 
Bank account of each contractor at start of 
the game 
$ 40,000 
Job cost $ 
10,000 for the slab cost, travel 
costs, delivery charges 
Total time of competition Weeks 8 
Maximum work capacity at outset of the 
game 
Jobs 3 
Loan amount for adding bid capacity $ 500 
Each job contract time Days 5 
Work week Days 6 (Monday to Saturday) 
Chances of rain delay Percent 30 
Construction cost accrued - Daily 
Payment for work Day 5th  
Bidding time Minutes 15 
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The production builder builds only one type of home and hence requires each 
contractor to pour only one type of slab. All i  players have been prequalified and only 
price matters, as is normal in this type of bidding system. An upper limit of 3.5 times the 
base cost is set as the maximum allowed by the game. This derives from a study of the 
base and range of sales prices for soft drink. A lower limit of 0.9 times the base cost is set 
as a minimum allowed by the game, unless the bidder elects to bid lower and confirms the 
bid. This rule was introduced to catch typing mistakes, such as a bidder bid offer of $1,500 
instead of $15,000, as the purchaser does not want bankrupt subcontractors. The rule is 
also to enforce the bank’s requirements of a reasonable return in a stable economic 
environment. Bidding period is 15 minutes per game, so there is a limit to the number of 
bids in the period (Yuan, 2013).  
One of the variables used in the game is rainfall. Rain on to many days on a working 
site during a week can delay completion and reduce the bidder’s capacity in the following 
week. Houston has relatively high rainfall from May to July every year. The game was 
assumed to played during this period, as this is when the first game occurred. Delay caused 
by rainfall was taken into accounted in this game. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA, 2010) provides the data on the statistical information for the 
probability of rain in Houston for the months of May, June and July. Figure 8 depicts the 
rain distribution for this area.  
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Figure 8. Rain probability in USA after NOAA (2010) 
The point is to introduce a random element to the game. If rain occurs on two days 
of the week on one of the awarded contracts sites for the week, then the contractor’s 
capacity in the following week is reduced by one. Table 7 represents the form of the rain 
delay matrix on each of the site location used in the case studies. “1” denotes enough 
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rainfall to cause a delay in construction, whereas “0” denotes no rainfall. Currently there 
is no correlation between the site locations and the amount of rainfall in that vicinity. 
Table 7 
Rain Delays for Week One 
Day 
Site 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Monday 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Tuesday 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Wednesday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thursday 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Friday 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Saturday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the login page of TAMU Reverse Auction Bidding system, each 
participants will have their own username and password to login. Figure 10 shows a 
sample data collection screen. The screen shows that the participant at week 4 with one 
completed jobs and four jobs in process. The participant also holds the lowest price for 
two bids ongoing now.  
If the bidding on this round is not over, then all other bidders have the opportunity 
to bid at lower price to win the job. 
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Figure 9. Reverse Auction Bidding login screen 
 
 
Figure 10. Reverse Auction Bidding - sample data screen  
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A mechanism was provided for each bidder to increase their capacity to bid as 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Bank loan screen 
The point of the game is to watch the development and the forms of competition in 
the game. Competition is introduced in two forms, the first by the purchaser providing a 
different number of jobs per week. Each participant has a capacity to pour three slabs per 
week, provided there is no rain. This means that the four players each have 25% of the 
market share. The corresponding Herfindahl index is 2500. The players compete for jobs.  
The players do have a mechanism to amend their capacity; the term used is a bank 
loan and this term is used for historical reasons. A payment of a fee of $500 to the bank 
increases the capacity of the bidder for one week by one job. Previous research has shown 
this is a powerful tool for winning more work (Gupta, 2010). A simple analysis based on 
the Herfindahl Index equation shows the relative change in the market strength of the 
players who take out bank loans.  
Figure 12 shows the change in the calculations for the Herfindahl Index for a change 
in capacity of one player from three to four and then five jobs per week. The Index changes 
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from 2500 to 2653, but the market strength as measured by the index moves from 625 to 
1275 for the peak bidder and from 625 to 459 for the others.  
The change explains some of the benefits of taking out bank loans. 
 
Figure 12. Herfindahl Index changes for capacity change 
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Data Structure 
There are nineteen research studies completed by previous master’s students at 
TAMU. Eight high quality data sets were used for this analysis. Table 8 summarizes the 
detailed information about the data sets used in this analysis.  
Table 8 
Study List 
Study No Student Name Participants 
1 Van Vleet 5 
4 Gujarathi 4 
9 Saigaonkar 4 
11 Gupta 4 
12 Patel 4 
14 Plumber 4 
15 Bedekar 4 
16 Katakam 4 
 
Table 9 shows a sample of the bid data taken from the first study. The data is stored 
during the game in a SQL Server database. There are a total of six tables in the database. 
SQL-Table 1 holds the log data for the people logged onto the computer system. SQL-
Table 2 holds the company names and login details. A company name is given to each 
player so that their confidentially is maintained during the game. SQL-Table 3 holds the 
job data, including start and end times. The numbers of jobs per week are determined using 
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a set of die. SQL-Table 4 holds the bid data as shown below on Table 9. SQL-Table 5 
holds the weather delay data and SQL-Table 6 holds the summary of the construction 
details. A number of integer flags are used to control data flow because a web site is 
essentially stateless (Paz, 2013).  
Table 9 
Bid Data - Sample after van Vleet (2004) 
Bid ID Job ID Ctr ID Bid Amount Bid Date Bid Time Bid Status 
1 1 9 $15,000.00 1 7:00:20 PM 0 
2 1 8 $13,000.00 1 7:00:22 PM 0 
3 3 9 $12,000.00 1 7:00:31 PM 0 
4 2 8 $14,000.00 1 7:00:53 PM 0 
5 1 4 $12,999.00 1 7:01:02 PM 0 
6 4 4 $20,000.00 1 7:01:25 PM 0 
7 12 6 $12,825.00 1 7:01:28 PM 0 
8 2 7 $13,500.00 1 7:01:29 PM 0 
9 5 9 $12,000.00 1 7:01:34 PM 0 
10 4 7 $15,000.00 1 7:01:36 PM 0 
11 1 8 $12,500.00 1 7:01:39 PM 0 
12 4 7 $14,000.00 1 7:01:48 PM 0 
13 7 8 $16,000.00 1 7:01:50 PM 0 
14 2 7 $13,000.00 1 7:01:54 PM 0 
15 11 4 $12,700.00 1 7:01:58 PM 0 
16 1 4 $12,400.00 1 7:02:21 PM 0 
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The stored data is: 
 Bid Id   consecutive integer 
 Job Id   Job number applied to a particular site and day 
 Ctr Id   Bidder Identity number used for the program 
 Bid Amount  Offer  
 Bid Date  Each week is numbered, 1, 2, 3 etc… 
 Bid Time  Time that the bid is offered by the bidder 
 Bid Status   Reserved for program use 
Table 10 shows a sample of the control data used for the game. The data is in 
four groups: 
 Identity Number used to record all details in the SQL Server database as 
the key identity. Five is reserved for system use 
 Name, Logon Name and Password. The logon name is usually a simple 
name such as shown here and does not link to the actual player 
 Capacity  current weekly capacity  
 Loan amount and the amount taken in bank loans 
It is suggested for future research purposes that the loan data include the timing of 
the loan data, so that the impact during particular rounds of the games can be studied 
effectively. The weekly capacity is recalculated at the end of each week to allow for rain 
and non-completion of some jobs and at the time of taking out a bank loan. 
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Table 10 
Reverse Auction Bidding Control Data 
ID Name Username Password Capacity Loan 
1 Doc Beith Butcher 3 $0.00 
2 Grumpy Coll WillGrimm 3 $0.00 
3 Happy Duir HalfPint 3 $0.00 
4 Sleepy Gort Napoleon 3 $4,000.00 
5 Reserved for system use 
6 Bashful Muir Grub 3 $2,500.00 
7 Sneezy Nion Chuck 3 $8,500.00 
8 Dopey Quert Wolf 3 $2,000.00 
9 Stealthy Gus Lenny 3 $11,000.00 
 
Table 11 shows an example of the job and profit details. The data columns are: 
 Control ID the contract number to identify each unique job 
 ID player identity number, if 5 then not awarded 
 Job ID the job identity number in the job list, some jobs may not be 
awarded 
 Cost for the job including base, travel, delivery and site costs 
 Profit for the job as a gross profit 
 Delay number of days of delay in the job due to rain 
 UC reserved for system use 
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 Begin Date are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc. so a week is seven days, 
commencing with Day 1 as a Monday, Sunday is observed as a day of 
rest as is common in the construction industry 
 End Date at the end of the contract, if equation 4 is true then there has 
been no impact on the capacity due to rain 
4EndDate BeginDate       (4) 
Table 11 
Profit and Job Data 
Control 
ID 
ID Job 
ID 
Cost Profit Delay UC Begin  
Date 
End  
Date 
1 4 1 $10,350.00 $1,650.00 0 5 2 6 
2 4 5 $10,350.00 $1,400.00 0 5 2 6 
3 9 13 $10,000.00 $900.00 0 5 2 6 
4 7 2 $10,450.00 $1,650.00 1 5 2 7 
5 4 3 $10,450.00 $1,549.00 1 5 2 7 
6 6 4 $10,450.00 $1,550.00 1 5 2 7 
7 7 7 $10,700.00 $1,600.00 2 5 2 8 
 
Petersen (2010) studied the performance of ξ bidders. The bid amounts for this game 
are shown on Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Bid distribution from RAB Study Ten after Petersen (2010) 
Data Analysis 
Researchers developed a number of the techniques used for the analysis of the 
Reverse Auction Bidding data, based on the work of the earlier researchers. The first stage 
in the data analysis is to sort the bid data for each different bidder. Table 12 shows a 
sample of the bid data from RAB Study Number 10 (Petersen, 2010).  
The data of interest is the bid reduction at each step of the play. This data can be 
collected from a sorted data set.  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
4500 4600 4700 4800 4900 5000 5100 5200 5300 5400 5500
B
id
 i
n
 $
Th
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Bid Number
   51 
Table 12 
Game 10 Bid Data Sample 
Bid Number Job Number Participant Bid Amount 
4750 1368 4 15450 
4741 1368 2 15550 
4733 1368 4 15582 
4730 1368 2 15600 
4713 1368 4 15850 
4710 1368 2 16000 
4708 1368 4 16750 
4707 1368 2 16800 
4701 1368 4 16890 
4700 1368 1 17000 
4698 1368 4 17400 
4696 1368 2 17500 
4691 1368 4 17520 
4675 1368 2 18000 
4661 1368 4 18500 
4653 1368 2 19000 
4643 1368 6 19999 
4619 1368 2 20000 
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The price reduction data is collected and then sorted into different bin range: 
between 1 and 10, between 10 and 100, between 100 and 1000, between 1000 and 10,000, 
and 10,000 above. Figure 14 shows the counts of the number of bid drops made by 
Participant 1 in RAB Research Number Four.  
 
Figure 14. Frequency of Different Profit Loss Level 
The figure shows that the bidder reduced the total bid group by $82,077. This 
represents a significant portion of the available profits.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the results for the analysis of the several games 
used for this study. The sections of the chapter are: 
 Summary of the Study Data  
 Analysis of the   Data 
 Findings 
Summary of the Study Data 
The research work is based on a group of the Reverse Auction bidding games 
completed at Texas A&M University since 2004. Table 13 lists the studies used in this 
work.  
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Table 13 
Study Results Summary 
Study 
No 
Participants 
Number of 
Bids 
Maximum 
Bid 
Minimum 
Bid 
Winning 
Bidder ID 
1 5 698 $1,200,000 $2,000 9 
4 4 347 $300,000 $133,335 3 
9 4 903 $60,000 $12,898 12 
11 4 865 $62,000 $11,700 2 
12 4 759 $64,000 $12,499 1 
14 4 1282 $60,416 $12,000 4 
15 4 708 $35,000 $11,800 1 
16 4 403 $64,000 $11,900 1 
 
Table 13 shows the study number, which relates to the order of the studies in the 
overall research work, the number of participants, the number of bids, the maximum bid 
and the minimum bid. These games are played by new bidders in each game, although a 
player was once used twice. Figure 15 shows a plot of the bid data for the original study 
by van Vleet (2004). 
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Figure 15. Study number 1 - bid data 
The other observation of importance in Table 13 is the variation in the bid 
maximums. The results point to the need for the conceptual development of the upper limit 
to the bid price. An upper bid limit was introduced by Gujarathi (2008) to provide an upper 
limit price point to match the real world linits. The limit is 3.5 times the base price 
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including the travelling and delivery costs. The travelling and delivery costs were recently 
adjusted upward to reflect current cost conditions. This idea stems from the reasonable 
concept that the purchaser has the economic sense to understand values that are 
economically excessive (Hartford, 2005).  
Figure 15 shows the early stage of low bids, which was studied and formalized by 
Chouhan (2009). The $2000 bid at a time when the average bid is $20,000 shows the 
problem of typing errors, this is the type of error that will lead to a court case or a broken 
relationship as most small contractors cannot absorb such a loss. This issue was fixed with 
the introduction of the check on low prices. There is also a bid limit of 0.9 times the base 
costs; this is in place to catch typing errors that would otherwise spoil the game data. 
Occasionally bid data includes losses instead of profits. Dharamshi (2014) recently 
completed a three game study; the 24th study in this research set. The third game in 
Dharamshi’s study shows atypical results including a number of losses and unusal profit 
levels. This game will be discarded for future analysis.  
Figure 16 shows the number of bids per job for each of the jobs. 
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Figure 16. Number of bids per job 
The key observations are the issue of flagging interest after job number 80, the high 
number of bids in the early game play, which leads to an erosion of profit. This observation 
on flagging interest has led to the standard eight round game, which based on an average 
of 7 to 8 jobs per game yields about 50 to 60 jobs in each game.  
In studying the profits levels between games, the method developed by Guhya (2010) 
was to normalize the profit using equation (1). Guhya’s method is applied to the profit on 
each job.  
Dharamshi (2014) studied the total profits obtained by each participant in three 
games to establish a more formal definition for the Type ξ, Type ζ and Type ϕ bidders. He 
used a standard 8 round game to define a Type ξ, as one who averaged 18% of the available 
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profit, a Type ζ player as one who averaged 2% of the available profit and a Type ϕ player 
as one who averaged about 9% of the total profit. One of the suggested indicators for poor 
performance is making significant reductions in the offered price, the rules of the game 
only require a reduction of one cent to make a valid bid, and anything more is essentially 
wasted profit in terms of the λ player. The λ player is a symbolic assignment, but poor 
average performance ultimately affects all bidders.  
The variable of interest is then moved to the bid drop or reduction in the price. 
Figure 17 shows a histogram plot of the binned bid reductions for the fourth study 
(Gujarathi, 2008).  
 
Figure 17. RAB Study 4 – bid reduction binned amounts 
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Figure 18. RAB Study 4 - bid amounts 
Figure 18 shows the issue with the binning procedure, the maximum drop in price 
is 18,000, which does not fit into the 10,000 bin, but is included in the 100,000 bin. Figure 
19 shows the complete bid drop data plotted as a histogram for the set of studies used in 
this research.  
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Figure 19. Study Set: Bid drop count 
As for the normalized total profit graph, this distribution is bi modal in nature 
(Borowski & Borwein, 1989). The next step is to normalize the data into fractions with 
the total fraction summing to one. The reduction of 0.1 represents the zero or opening bid 
that has no “theoretical drop” as a zero value will not plot on a logarithmic graph.  
Figure 20 shows the bid reduction count data for all of the studies included in this 
research presented as a fraction of the total of 5286 bids.  
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Figure 20. Study Set: Bid drop count – fractions of total count 
The simplest assumption is that it easiest to type 28000 to bid below 29,000 than 
any other number. It is illustrative to look at the bid drop data for a single job, with a group 
of bids. Figure 21 shows a sample of the   data, this represents the price drop per bid for 
this job. 
Table 14 shows the mean value and standard deviation for each bidder or participant 
for job 10. The results from the table suggest that participant 4 is a better bidder than the 
others.  
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Figure 21. Study Number 4 – Job number 10 bid  data 
Table 14 
Study Number 4: Job Number 10 Bid Data 
Participant Mean Value of  Bid   Data Standard Deviation 
1 918 1400 
2 680 460 
3 550 800 
4 42 75 
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Figure 22 shows the bid data plotted in bid order. The drop of 3,500 at bid number 
4 is significant in the overall loss on the job, representing 1 bid in 24, but 25% of the profit 
loss.  
 
Figure 22. Study Number 4 - job number 10 bid data plot 
A linear regression analysis of the bid data on Figure 22 yields an equation of the 
traditional form shown in equation (5): 
y mx b         (5) 
The regression equation results are presented in Table 15. One measure of reliability 
of data is the variation in the ratio of the standard error to the value, in this case the slope 
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variation is 6.7%. This is a good fit for human based data. The secondary measures in the 
linear regression are the normal probability plot and the residual plot.  
Table 15 
Regression Analysis Results 
Component Value Standard Error t-Stat 
m 29044 455 64 
b -482 32 15 
 
Figure 23 shows the normal probability plot for the bid data. The data is clearly 
normally distributed except for the large drop on the 3-4th bids.  
 
Figure 23. Study Number 4 - job number 10 normal probability plot 
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Figure 24 shows the issue of the large drop in the bidding and the apparent cyclic 
pattern in the bid data.  
 
Figure 24. Study Number 4 - job number 10 residual plot 
In summary, the bid drops in excess of $2000 are not within the normal or Gaussian 
estimates of the distribution of bids. The issues with this bidding are: 
 the fourth bidder brings in an initial price of $30,000, which is approximately 
$20,000 below the upper limit 
 although the bidders were consistent in the number of bids, the scatter on each 
bid differential is significant 
Figure 25 shows the pattern of the   data for the tenth job in study number 4.  
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Figure 25. Study Number 4: job number 10: bid   data 
Participant 4 is clearly an economically efficient bidder in terms of reducing the 
amount given away with each bid. The interesting observation is that this study developed 
the concept of the upper limit on price, but these bidders did not exceed $30,000 on any 
offer.  
This analysis however points to the difficulty of identifying an economically 
efficient bidder, is the efficiency in the bid process or merely the total profit made at the 
end of the game.  
Analysis of the   Data 
A summary of the   data for each of the studies is given in Table 16. The critical 
observation with this data is the preponderance of bid amount drops in the $1000 range. 
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This could be due to the ease of typing 29,000 in place of 29,999 if bidding against a 
$30,000 bid.  
Table 16 
Summary of the δ Data 
Study 
No 
Bid Differential   Data 
 
0 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 10,000+ 
1 
78 88 8 89 511 2 0 
4 
39 88 20 42 130 14 7 
9 
64 132 18 77 58 5 0 
11 
96 139 102 156 251 93 28 
12 
93 334 65 48 108 62 48 
14 
92 151 5 43 455 286 50 
15 
71 98 98 214 149 71 7 
16 
63 30 2 9 136 150 13 
  
Figure 26 shows the data in a graphical form to highlight the peak points at $1 and 
$1000.  
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Figure 26. Bid differential data - all studies 
Appendix A contains a detailed analysis of each study in terms of bid differentials 
and an inter-game comparison of the results. The results in Appendix A show: 
 a strategy can be observed in the bid differential play, it does not always 
result in the highest returns, but it is significant and discernable statistically 
in the data 
 the range of profits, and bid differentials is significant given that the only 
bidding pressure in the game is from the λ player 
 some people are very poor bidders and do poorly in the game 
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Some researchers opined that a strategy existed to beat the bidders who lowered by 
only a low amount, such as one dollar. The strategy is to make a bid that is significantly 
lower, so as to signal that the bidder is aggressive and the strategic bidder seeks profits 
elsewhere. This pattern search is a separate study.  
The first hypothesis is:  
A statistically evident bias exists between the average return generated by 
the Type  bidder and the Type  bidder.  
Figure 27 shows that there is a statistically significant difference in the average 
returns generated by the players based on their rank in the profit sum for each game. The 
Type ξ or efficient bidders won on average in excess of 180,000 per game, whereas the 
Type ζ or inefficient bidders won on average less than 80,000 per game. These results are 
in line with the observations by Dharamshi (2014), who studied three separate game 
results.  
The second hypothesis is: 
Type  bidders minimize the price reduction for each bid.  
The data shows that some players do attempt to minimize the bid differentials, but 
this is not the group generally defined as Type  bidders. Some opinions suggest why this 
hypothesis was not true for this study data.  
 


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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
In an economic system, the reward comes in the form of profit. There is no getting 
away from the observation that economically efficient participants in the Reverse Auction 
bidding game are perceived to be those participants who make the most money under 
standard game conditions. There are other forms of economic efficiency, reducing costs 
whilst maintaining prices increases profit, but this game the reliance is on a sound strategy 
for bidding.  
The Reverse Auction Bidding game was developed at TAMU by Mr. van Vleet in 
2014 as part of the work for a Master’s paper. Since that time, twenty four further studies 
have been completed using the game system or in doing advanced statistical analysis of 
aspects of the game or game theory. One of the theories advanced was that an 
economically efficient bidder could be identified from the set of all bidders; this bidder 
was termed the Type ξ bidder, to avoid the term economically efficient. Conversely the 
economically inefficient bidder could be identified and termed the Type ζ bidder.  
This research looked at two aspects of the game and the statistical data. The first 
aspect was based on the theory that the Type ξ bidder and the Type ζ bidder could be 
defined by the quantum of the returns. This is stated in hypothesis one. The hypothesis is 
true, a rank order analysis of the returns showed that the rank one bidders earned on 
average more than 180,000 per game and the low rank bidders, rank four or five earned 
on average less than 80,000 per game. The results are statistically significant at the 5% 
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level. The second hypothesis is that the Type ξ bidder would use a strategy of minimizing 
the bid differentials to increase their returns. A set of bidders exist who appear to minimize 
the bid differentials, but the set does not contain all of the Type ξ bidders, nor is it 
exclusive of Type ξ bidders. This hypothesis is not true.  
The economically efficient bidders are not the ones who win the most awards, nor 
come in first in the game under all circumstances as we have defined now the Type ξ 
bidder by an average return instead of just first place in a game. A further study is 
suggested to combine a bid arrivals study and profit strategy to look for the strategies for 
optimum price and most awards. 
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 APPENDIX A 
ANALYSIS OF THE BID DATA 
 
Introduction 
The stages of the bid data analysis are: 
 determine the rank order and profit amounts of the participants in each of 
the games 
 determine the bid drop data, rank order and descriptive statistics for this data 
Games – Profit and Rank Order of Participants 
Table 17 summarizes the rank order of the participants for total profit in each of the 
games. The participant number matches the number assigned in the SQL database for each 
study. Table 18 shows the profit numbers for each game in rank order.  
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Table 17  
Participant Rank Order for Profit 
Study Participant Rank Order for Profit 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 9 7 4 8 6 
4 1 3 2 4 - 
9 12 1 3 4 - 
11 1 4 2 12 - 
12 1 2 4 3 - 
14 3 4 1 2  
15 4 3 1 2 - 
16 1 3 2 4 - 
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Table 18  
Profit Rank Order 
Study Profit in Rank Order 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 68950 68122 43033 42225 18825 
4 107424 91571 50103 28980 - 
9 231104 123474 61240 45203 - 
11 393965 368126 310565 297881 - 
12 159074 157268 150114 125084 - 
14 433434 334706 302232 252181  
15 45212 18193 17755 14833 - 
16 269321 99846 53873 35098 - 
 
Figure 27 shows the average profit for each rank order. Whilst there is some 
statistical debate about taking a regression on rank order data, the results are shown on the 
figure. The averaged data shows a relationship that is not evident in the complete data set 
using an analysis of profit against bid drop.  
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Figure 27. Profit average for each rank 
Games – Bid Drop – Mean Data in Logarithmic Form 
The bid drop data shows a wide distribution from 1 cent to 20,000 dollars. The data 
can be binned into logarithmic sets to mitigate the dominance of a few large bids. The bid 
drops means are shown in Table 19. The average results have been determined for each of 
the data sets based on order in the SQL Server participant number ranking.  
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Table 19  
Logarithmic Mean of the Bid Drops 
Study Logarithmic Mean of the Bid Drops 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2.61 3.73 2.71 3.38 2.36 
4 1.91 2.27 0.99 1.63 - 
9 2.01 2.08 2.54 1.52 - 
11 2.20 1.05 2.04 1.84 - 
12 0.76 0.96 1.82 2.02 - 
14 3.03 2.87 3.00 0.89 - 
15 2.23 1.65 1.40 1.85 - 
16 1.79 3.22 3.18 3.11 - 
Average 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 - 
 
The results shown in Table 19 has a mean value of 2.14 ±0.77. Table 20 shows a 
Student’s t Test analysis for the unordered bid drop data. The data for the first listed 
participant in the SQL database is compared to the second column. The analysis is 
repeated for each combination of columns. The simple hypothesis being tested is that there 
is no statistical differences in the column data as it should be randomly assigned. The 
results show that the all of the separate column data is drawn from a similar set to the other 
column data.  
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Table 20 
Student t Test results for Participants Columns for Bid Data Drops 
 2    
1 0.37 0.39 0.1 NC 
2  0.04 0.44 NC 
3   0.45 NC 
 
Games – Bid Drop -Rank Order 
The next step in the analysis is to place the bid drop data in increasing numerical 
order of the bid drop data in logarithmic form is shown in Table 21. The mean value for 
each rank order from 1 to 5 is also shown in the table. 
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Table 21 
Numerical Increasing Order of the Bid Drop Data in Logarithmic Form 
Study Participant 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2.36 2.61 2.71 3.38 3.73 
4 0.99 1.63 1.91 2.27  
9 1.52 2.01 2.08 2.54  
11 1.05 1.84 2.04 2.2  
12 0.76 0.96 1.82 2.02  
14 0.89 2.87 3 3.03  
15 1.4 1.65 1.85 2.23  
16 1.79 3.11 3.18 3.22  
Average 1.345 2.085 2.32375 2.61125 3.73 
 
A regression analysis for the average data compared to the rank order was 
completed using standard regression techniques. Figure 28 shows the results of the linear 
regression analysis and the fitted line.  
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Figure 28. Regression plot for the bid drop results against rank order 
The results show that the bid drop amounts are related in a linear fashion to the rank 
order for the data. Figure 29 shows the normal probability plot from the residual analysis. 
The plot shows the data is normally distributed. Figure 30 shows the residual data, the 
number of points is too limited to draw firm conclusions, but the results do not show a 
discernable pattern.  
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Figure 29. Normal probability plot for the bid drop results against rank order 
 
Figure 30. Residual data plot for the bid drop results against rank order 
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Games Descriptive Data  
The descriptive data for each game is presented in the following figures. The data 
is the bidder id, the mean value for the profit lost in the bid differentials, the logarithmic 
means of this data, the percentage of the awards for each bidder, the rank order in terms 
of the number of bids won, the rank order for bid drop differentials and the difference in 
the two ranks.  
Table 22 shows the descriptive data. The interesting player in this set is participant 
001-7, who won 30% of the awards, ranked third on the bid differentials and had the 
second highest profit.  
Table 22 
Game 1 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
Bidder 
ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Total 
Awards 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
Saving 
Rank 
 
001-4 415.05 2.618104 20.0% 3 2 1 
001-6 5442.7 3.735818 12.0% 5 5 0 
001-7 521.33 2.717116 29.3% 1 3 -2 
001-8 2403.9 3.380924 16.0% 4 4 0 
001-9 230.6 2.362861 22.7% 2 1 1 
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Table 23 shows the descriptive data for game 4. The interesting player here is 
number 2, the player came in third in the profit level, but had the greatest number of awards. 
This appears to indicate an overly aggressive player who is not thinking strategically.  
Table 23 
Game 4 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
Bidder ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Total 
Awards 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank 
for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
Saving 
Rank 
 
004-1 81.15976 1.9093408 12.1% 4 3 1 
004-2 185.8186 2.2690893 45.5% 1 4 -3 
004-3 9.780366 0.9903551 27.3% 2 1 1 
004-4 42.49147 1.6283017 15.2% 3 2 1 
 
Table 24 shows the descriptive data for game 9. Participant 009-12 showed that a 
good performance in winning awards, getting the highest profit in this game and reducing 
the amount lost on bid differentials is possible.  
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Table 24 
Game 9 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
Bidder 
ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Total 
Awards 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
Saving 
Rank 
 
009-1 102.4 2.010281 20.3% 3 2 1 
009-3 121.7 2.085293 18.6% 4 3 1 
009-4 348.41 2.542095 35.6% 1 4 -3 
009-12 33.441 1.524283 25.4% 2 1 1 
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Table 25 shows the descriptive data for game 11. Participant 1 made the greatest 
profit, but did not play very strategically.  
Table 25 
Game 11 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
Bidder 
ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Total 
Awards 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
Saving 
Rank 
 
011-1 158.44 2.1998524 21.7% 3 4 -1 
011-2 11.382 1.0562159 21.7% 3 1 2 
011-4 111.16 2.0459382 22.7% 2 3 -1 
011-12 70.556 1.8485368 34.0% 1 2 -1 
but the overall profit was low. 
Table 26 shows the descriptive data for game 12. Participant 012-1 performed well 
in all measures, but the overall profit was low. 
Table 26 
Game 12 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
Bidder 
ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
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Total 
Awards 
Saving 
Rank 
012-1 5.7593 0.7603668 36.3% 1 1 0 
012-2 9.2558 0.9664162 20.9% 3 2 1 
012-3 66.107 1.8202459 18.7% 4 3 1 
012-4 107 2.0293956 24.2% 2 4 -2 
r than expected for this player. 
Table 27 shows the descriptive data for game 14. This game had exceptionally high 
profits for all players, all would be classified as Type ξ players. Participant 014-3 led in 
two of the three measures, the bid differential was higher than expected for this player. 
Table 27 
Game 14 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
Bidder 
ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Total 
Awards 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
Saving 
Rank 
014-1 1082.7 3.034511 22.0% 3 4 -1 
014-2 755.89 2.878457 20.9% 4 2 2 
014-3 1009.4 3.0040495 33.0% 1 3 -2 
014-4 7.8126 0.8927939 24.2% 2 1 1 
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Table 28 shows the descriptive data for game 15. Participant 014-4 made the greatest 
profit, but all participants performed poorly and would be classified as Type ζ bidders 
for all intents and purposes.  
Table 28 
Game 15 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
Bidder 
ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Total 
Awards 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
Saving 
Rank 
015-1 171.13 2.2333277 30.0% 1 1 0 
015-2 44.702 1.6503266 30.0% 1 3 -2 
015-3 25.165 1.4007969 22.9% 3 4 -1 
015-4 78.641 1.8956502 17.1% 4 2 2 
 
Table 29 shows the descriptive data for game 16. Participant 016-1 performed well 
on all measures, made a significant profit and would be classified as a Type ξ player. 
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Bidder 
ID 
Profit 
Loss 
Mean 
Logarithmic 
Mean 
Awards 
Number/ 
Total 
Awards 
Rank for 
Awards  
Rank for 
Saving 
Award 
Rank – 
Saving 
Rank 
 
016-1 61.86 1.7914066 35.5% 1 1 0 
016-2 1686.1 3.2268785 24.2% 2 4 -2 
016-3 1542.7 3.1882837 21.0% 3 3 0 
016-4 1290.3 3.1106805 19.4% 4 2 1 
 
Summary 
The results show a linear relationship between the participant rank order to the bid 
drop differentials.  
Table 29 
Game 16 Summary of the Descriptive Data 
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APPENDIX B 
THE KEIRSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER 
For each question, decide on answer a or b and put a check mark in the proper column 
of the answer sheet.  Scoring directions are provided.  There is no right or wrong answers 
since about half the population agrees with whatever answer you choose.  
1. When the phone rings do you 
a. hurry to get to it first 
b. hope someone will answer 
2. Are you more 
a. observant than introspective 
b. introspective than observant 
3. Is it worse to  
a. have your head in the clouds 
b. be in a rut 
4. With people are you usually more 
a. firm than gentle 
b. gentle than firm 
5. Are you more comfortable in 
making 
a. critical judgments 
b. value judgments 
6. Is clutter in the workplace 
something you 
a. take time to straighten up 
b. tolerate pretty well 
7. Is it your way to  
a. make up your mind quickly 
b. pick and choose at some length 
8. Waiting in line, do you often 
a. chat with others 
b. b.  stick to business 
9. Are you more 
a. sensible than ideational 
b. ideational than sensible 
10. Are you more interested in  
a. what is actual 
b. what is possible 
11. In making up your mind are you 
more likely  
a. to go by data 
b. to go by desires   
12. In sizing up others do you tend to 
be 
a. objective and impersonal 
b. friendly and personal 
13. Do you prefer contracts to be 
a. signed, sealed, and delivered 
b. settled on a handshake 
14. Are you more satisfied having 
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a. a finished product 
b. work in progress 
15.   At a party, do you 
a. interact with many, even 
strangers 
b. interact with a few friends 
16.   Do you tend to be more 
a. factual than speculative 
b. speculative than factual 
17. Do you like writers who 
a. say what they mean 
b. use metaphors and symbolism 
18. Which appeals to you more: 
a. consistency of thought 
b. harmonious relationships 
19. If you must disappoint someone are 
you  
a. usually frank and 
straightforward 
b. warm and considerate 
20. On the job do you want your 
activities 
a. scheduled 
b. unscheduled 
21. Do you more often prefer 
a. final, unalterable statements 
b. tentative, preliminary statements 
22. Does interacting with strangers 
a. energize you 
b. tax your reserves 
23. Facts 
a. speak for themselves 
b. illustrate principles 
24. Do you find visionaries and 
theorists 
a. somewhat annoying 
b. rather fascinating 
25. In a heated discussion, do you 
a. stick to your guns 
b. look for common ground 
26. Is it better to be 
a. Just 
b. merciful 
27. At work, is it more natural for you 
to 
a. point out mistakes 
b. try to please others 
28. Are you more comfortable 
a. after a decision 
b. before a decision 
29. Do you tend to 
a. say right out what’s on your 
mind 
b. keep your ears open 
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30. Common sense is 
a. usually reliable 
b. frequently questionable 
31. Children often do not 
a. make themselves useful enough 
b. exercise their fantasy enough 
32. When in charge of others do you 
tend to be 
a. firm and unbending 
b. forgiving and lenient 
33. Are you more often 
a. a cool-headed person 
b. a warm-hearted person 
34. Are you prone to 
a. nailing things down 
b. exploring the possibilities 
35. In most situations are you more 
a. deliberate than spontaneous 
b. spontaneous than deliberate 
36. Do you think of yourself as 
a. an outgoing person 
b. a private person 
37. Are you more frequently 
a. a practical sort of person 
b. a fanciful sort of person 
38. Do you speak more in  
a. particulars than generalities 
b. generalities than particular 
39. Which is more of a compliment: 
a. “There’s a logical person” 
b. “There’s a sentimental person”  
40. Which rules you more 
a. your thoughts 
b. your feelings 
41. When finishing a job, do you like to 
a. tie up all the loose ends 
b. move on to something else 
42. Do you prefer to work 
a. to deadlines 
b. just whenever 
43. Are you the kind of person who 
a. is rather talkative 
b. doesn’t miss much 
44. Are you inclined to take what is 
said 
a. more literally 
b. more figuratively 
45. Do you more often see 
a. what’s right in front of you 
b. what can only be imagined 
46. Is it worse to be 
a. softy 
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b. hard-nosed 
47. In trying circumstances are you 
sometimes 
a. too unsympathetic 
b. too sympathetic 
48. Do you tend to choose 
a. rather carefully 
b. somewhat impulsively 
49. Are you inclined to be more 
a. hurried than leisurely 
b. leisurely than hurried 
50. At work do you tend to 
a. be sociable with your colleagues 
b. keep more to yourself 
51. Are you more likely to trust 
a. your experiences 
b. your conceptions 
52. Are you more inclined to feel 
a. down to earth 
b. somewhat removed 
53. Do you think of yourself as a  
a. tough-minded person 
b. tender-hearted person 
54. Do you value in yourself more that 
you are 
a. reasonable 
b. devoted 
55. Do you usually want things 
a. settled and decided 
b. just penciled in 
56. Would you say you are more 
a. serious and determined 
b. easy going 
57. Do you consider yourself 
a. a good conversationalist 
b. a good listener 
58. Do you prize in yourself 
a. a strong hold on reality 
b. a vivid imagination 
59. Are you drawn more to 
a. fundamentals 
b. overtones 
60. Which seems the greater fault 
a. to be too compassionate 
b. to be too dispassionate 
61. Are you swayed more by 
a. convincing evidence 
b. a touching appeal 
62. Do you feel better about 
a. coming to closure 
b. keeping your options open 
63. Is it preferable mostly to  
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a. make sure things are arranged 
b. just let things happen naturally 
64. Are you inclined to be 
a. easy to approach 
b. somewhat reserved 
65. In stories do you prefer 
a. action and adventure 
b. fantasy and heroism 
66. Is it easier for you to 
a. put others to good use 
b. identify with others 
67. Which do you wish more for 
yourself: 
a. strength of will 
b. strength of emotion 
68. Do you see yourself as basically 
a. thick-skinned 
b. thin-skinned 
69. Do you tend to notice 
a. disorderliness 
b. opportunities for change 
70. Are you more 
a. routinized than whimsical 
b. whimsical than routinized  
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APPENDIX C 
KIERSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER SCORING  
 
Introduction 
Table 30 shows a sample of the KTS Scoring sheet.  
Table 30  
KTS Scoring Sheet 
Enter a check for each answer in the column for a or b. 
 a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
8   9   10   11   12   13   14   
15   16   17   18   19   20   21   
22   23   24   25   26   27   28   
29   30   31   32   33   34   35   
36   37   38   39   40   41   42   
43   44   45   46   47   48   49   
+50   51   52   53   54   55   56   
57   58   59   60   61   62   63   
64   65   66   67   68   69   70   
 1   23 
3    
  43    45    65    67    87    
         
 
 
3     4 
 S N  
1     2 
 E I  
5     6 
 T F  
7     
 J P 
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Directions for Scoring 
The directions for scoring the test are: 
1. Add down so that the total number of a answers is written in the box at the bottom 
of each column.  Do the same for the b answers you have checked.  Each of the 14 
boxes should have a number it. 
2. Transfer the number in box #1 of the answer grid to box #1 below the answer 
grid.  Do this for box # 2 as well.  Note, however, that you have two numbers for 
boxes 3 through 8.  Bring down the first number for each box beneath the second, as 
indicated by the arrows.  Now add all the pairs of numbers and enter the total in the 
boxes below the answer grid, so each box has only one number. 
3. Now you have four pairs of numbers.  Circle the letter below the larger numbers of 
each pair.  If the two numbers of any pair are equal, then circle neither, but put a 
large X below them and circle it. 
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Human Subjects Protection Program    Institutional Review Board 
 
 
DATE: 10-April-2014 
                      MEMORANDUM 
TO: LI, JIAXING 
 77843-3578 
FROM: Office of Research Compliance 
 Institutional Review Board 
SUBJECT: Initial Review 
 
Protocol 
Number: 
IRB2014-0176M 
Title: Reverse Auction Bidding  
Review 
Category: 
Expedited 
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Approval 
Period: 
10-April-2014 To 01-April-2011 
 
Approval determination was based on the following Code of Federal 
Regulations: 
 
45 CFR 46.110(b)(1) - Some or all of the research appearing on the list and found 
by the reviewer(s) to involve no more than minimal risk. 
------------ 
(7) Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, but not 
limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, 
communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research 
employing survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human 
factors evaluation or quality assurance methodologies. 
 
(Note: Some research in this category may be exempt from the HHS regulations for 
the protection of human subjects. 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) and (b) (3). This listing 
refers only to research that is not exempt.)  
 
Provisions:  
 
 
This research project has been approved for one (1) year. As principal investigator, 
you assume the following responsibilities 
1. Continuing Review: The protocol must be renewed each year in 
order to continue with the research project. A Continuing Review 
along with required documents must be submitted 30 days before the 
end of the approval period. Failure to do so may result in processing 
delays and/or non-renewal.  
2. Completion Report: Upon completion of the research project 
(including data analysis and final written papers), a Completion 
Report must be submitted to the IRB Office.  
3. Adverse Events: Adverse events must be reported to the IRB Office 
immediately.  
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4. Amendments: Changes to the protocol must be requested by 
submitting an Amendment to the IRB Office for review. The 
Amendment must be approved by the IRB before being implemented.  
5. Informed Consent: Information must be presented to enable 
persons to voluntarily decide whether or not to participate in the 
research project.  
This electronic document provides notification of the review results by the Institutional Review Board. 
 
 
